Two dysfunctions can affect the credit market: credit rationing and discouragement. While the former has been studied in detail for more than 40 years, the latter has only been in the spotlight since 2003. In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of this “demand-side failure” by investigating the role played by corruption. In particular, using data from the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank, we highlight, on the one hand, a significant negative overall link between corruption and “discouraged borrowers” in developing countries, and on the other, the fact that this effect is non-linear and differs according to the level of economic development: in more (resp. less) developed countries, the higher the level of corruption, the more (resp. less) companies are discouraged from applying for loans. We also find that the burden of government regulation can explain this effect. To overcome this burden, firms see corruption as one way to reach their targets at lower costs.
pas encore adhérent ?
Sélectionnez votre profil :
Inclus dans les formules
-
A partir de 10 adhésions individuelles
-
Référence sur le site WEB
-
Référence sur l'annuaire papier
-
Un numéro gratuit de la revue FINANCE
L'adhésion individuelle permet de recevoir les informations diffusées par l'AFFI, d'accéder à l'historique des publications dans la revue Finance et de bénéficier d'un tarif préférentiel pour participer aux conférences.
Vous pouvez finaliser le processus de soumission d'un article à la revue Finance en vous acquittant des frais s'élevant à 100 euros.
Déjà adhérent ?
Accédez à vos services, gérez et ajoutez des Adhésions :